

RESEARCH ARTICLE**WWW.PEGEGOG.NET****Political and Social Movements in Arab Societies - Tunisia and Egypt (2011-2016) as Models**

Dr. Sghir Hayat¹, Housny Hamra²

¹ Abou Bakr Belkaid University of Tlemcen (Algeria). Email: hayat.sghir@univ-tlemcen.dz, orcid: <https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2312-0711>

² Maghnia University Center, Algeria, Email: h.hamra@cu-maghnia.dz, orcid: <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5288-0383>

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Abstract:

The Arab region has witnessed a broad social and political movement that aimed to bring about change in authoritarian political systems and improve social and economic conditions. This movement was manifested in a series of uprisings and protests in which various social groups and strata participated. Its initial spark originated from Tunisia before extending to other Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and others. Arab researchers and thinkers differed in their characterization of this movement, with its names ranging between revolutions, uprisings, protests, and popular eruptions. Although this movement expressed, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, a clear revolutionary state in its beginnings, the developments that occurred in the subsequent five years demonstrated its failure to achieve the intended goals, due to the intertwining of a series of internal, regional, and international factors.

Keywords:

Social and political movements – Revolution – Arab region – Armed groups – Religious extremism – Authoritarian political systems – Democracy – Security issue – Uprisings.

Introduction:

The world has witnessed, in recent decades, an accelerating transition from an industrial society to a knowledge society, making peoples and cultures seem to live within a single electronic global village. In this

context, globalization, or what is known as neoliberalism, has imposed its global project based on economic liberalization and market opening, which led to the subjection of most countries in the world, particularly the Arab world from east to west, to the dominance of multinational foreign corporations. It was then widely believed that this economic, political, and cultural alternative, imposed from European centralism, would put an end to manifestations of Arab social movements in all their forms, and would contribute to reducing social disparities, eliminating poverty, deprivation, and social injustice, leading to the consolidation of democracy and the achievement of social justice.

However, the Arab region has witnessed, beginning from the year 2011, a rapid-paced social and political movement that sought to change existing systems of governance and improve the deteriorating economic and social conditions suffered by wide segments of society, particularly the poor and unemployed youth. This movement received considerable attention from Arab researchers and thinkers; however, their positions toward it varied. Some saw in it a fully-fledged social revolution, while others considered it merely uprisings, protests, rebellions, or popular eruptions that do not, in their view, rise to the level of revolution, basing this on the classical Marxist interpretation which requires the existence of a clear revolutionary ideology, a specific social class, and an elite leading the process of change.

This intellectual debate concerning social movements in the Arab region derives its legitimacy from the diversity of intellectual, political, and religious backgrounds from which researchers and thinkers proceed, as well as from the particularity of this movement that occurred in an Arab space characterized by distinctive historical, social, cultural, and political features.

In the midst of this discussion and intellectual disagreement at its various levels, this study seeks to reveal the problematic of the overlap between the concept of revolution and other closely related concepts, on the one hand, and to analyze the shared characteristics of Arab revolutions, particularly the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, on the other hand, in addition to reading the most prominent results they produced, on the third hand.

Analysis:

- Revolution: One Concept with Multiple Definitions:

Researchers and thinkers do not agree on a single definition for the phenomenon of movement witnessed by the Arab region in the current phase, which distinguishes it from other concepts that are often employed as if they carry meanings similar to it. This confusion and even perplexity in defining concepts is shared by researchers in social and political sciences, journalists, and media professionals. They all employ the concepts of the Arab Spring, uprisings, protests, Arab awakenings, Islamic awakenings, and popular eruptions... as if they were similar to the concept of revolution.

Many observers acknowledge this epistemological difficulty, as do Arab strategic research centers, which have devoted considerable intellectual space to monitoring the current Arab scene in its internal, regional, and international transformations and conflicts. As stated: "It is difficult, amid the political storms witnessed by the Arab world since the beginning of 2011, to formulate a completed thesis that reflects the nature of transformations, defines their identity, and encompasses their premises and outcomes. Even if we agree to deal positively with the

common headlines in media, political, and intellectual discourses, insofar as defining transformations as revolutions that opened the door to democratic change, we cannot overlook that enormous network of complications and overlaps that push the revolutionary event toward the chaos of civil strife and national fragmentation. Therefore, the vision most proximate to reality indicates that the Arab event, in all its regions and fields, is an event shrouded in thick fog, but open to endless possibilities and promises."¹

The researcher in social sciences does not find a single agreed-upon definition of the concept of revolution, which overlaps considerably with other concepts, particularly with the concepts of rebellion and disobedience. These concepts bear a common signification or feature among them, represented in the fact that they all mean that radical transformation of all existing social, political, and economic systems, or—at least—a change in the political system in ways that contradict the laws prevailing in society. As stated: "What is meant by revolution is a broad popular movement outside the existing constitutional structure, or outside legitimacy, whose objective is to change the existing system of governance in the state. Revolution in this sense is a movement for changing an existing political legitimacy that is not recognized and replacing it with a new legitimacy. This definition distinguishes revolution from military coup d'état in contemporary Arabic terminology, because the latter does not necessarily reflect popular movement, but it leaves the possibility open that a military coup could be supported by popular forces aimed at changing the system of governance. It also distinguishes revolution from popular protest uprisings or rebellions of all kinds in cases where they do not raise the question of changing the ruling system."²

If the prevailing view of revolution is that it is a popular movement seeking to overthrow political authority from below without the use of armed force, then this applies to the popular uprisings witnessed by the Arab region. However, all researchers who believed that the Arab movement takes on the character of revolution are confronted with views and

perceptions emanating from other researchers who question this characterization and apply many other characterizations to this scene, including a revolutionary state, uprising, and protests. Samir Amin states, while describing the social movement in Egypt: "The movement that took place in Egyptian society at the end of January 2011 appears to me, in fact, to be a revolutionary outbreak that may turn into a revolutionary tide, nothing more. What happened is more than merely an uprising, or an outburst after which society returns to what it was before, that is, more than a protest movement, but it is also less than a revolution. In the sense that that movement did not have clear objectives that went beyond the overthrow of Mubarak. This is due to the nature of the clear and implicit demands of the forces that engaged in that movement and their objectives."³

This definition views the social movement in Egypt as transcending the concepts of protests and uprisings, yet this movement is not a revolution, as it did not go beyond the bounds of expressing its suffering and its social and economic circumstances and lacks an alternative social project to the defunct political system. It appears that this view is derived from the Marxist conception of the concept of revolution.

In the same direction, Gilbert Achcar states: "The political revolution in Tunisia and Egypt did not affect the largest part of the apparatus of the fallen regime's state... Neither of these countries has yet experienced a social revolution, meaning a deep transformation in its social structure. Only sections of varying size at the top of the social hierarchy were affected, while the social hierarchy itself did not change anywhere. For my part, I have described the uprisings underway, since the early months of 2011, as constituting a long-term revolutionary process, which is a formulation that allows for reconciling the revolutionary nature of the event and its incompleteness."⁴

This perception does not differ from Samir Amin's view, in that the movement in Tunisia and Egypt did not change the structure of the previous political system; they only

affected some of its parts. Revolution is a radical transformation of all social, political, and economic structures, and this has not been achieved not only in Tunisia and Egypt, but also in the Arab region that witnessed social and political movement.

It appears that it is quite difficult to measure the current Arab movement by the standards of Western thought and its characterizations of facts and events in Arab societies, because their social, political, and economic realities are bound to specific cultural and ideological peculiarities. By this we mean that it is more methodologically and epistemologically appropriate that we reconsider those Western concepts and perceptions, and that we maintain epistemological vigilance to transcend their obstacles and thus establish new concepts emanating from the specificities of our Arab societies and not from those of Western societies. We should therefore invest in knowledge and scientific methods that respond to these specificities and that possess the epistemological capacity and flexibility to diagnose events and facts in an objective manner.

If the most pressing questions in strategic research and study centers attempt to reveal the nature and affiliations of these Arab revolutions, then what is most important—for us—is represented in acknowledging that peoples with all their components have risen up and persisted through peaceful means and removed authoritarian systems, and have expressed their capacity for change and response to various challenges, demanding their material and symbolic rights represented in dignified living, housing, employment, freedom, dignity, and social justice...

These peoples formed one body as they repeated their distinctive and common slogan: "The people want," a cry that rolled from one Arab country to another, having its birth in Tunisia then moving to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria...and summed up the suffering of peoples belonging to a geography governed by authoritarian systems that practiced different forms of injustice and tyranny upon them. That cry is an expression of a culture of peoples that

aspire and yearn to change their circumstances and improve their conditions. In doing so, it constitutes a type or form of social consciousness. Abdelaziz Boumsoholi states: "If we view revolution as a political and social event, that does not at all mean stripping it of its cultural-philosophical dimension, for revolution without an intellectual foundation is nothing but blind mob frenzy, because the cultural-philosophical foundation is the spirit of revolution that determines its goal, or at least establishes its future project despite the divergence of intellectual, ideological, and doctrinal currents and tendencies that compete to win over a particular orientation or tendency, and therefore to lead a post-revolutionary society..."⁵

This conception highlights the relationship of interaction and integration between the revolutionary act and the ideas carried by the revolutionaries, and focuses mainly on the existential human dimension that aims to achieve human freedom. Thus revolution becomes an act inherent in freedom and resistant to injustice and tyranny in all its forms.

- Characteristics of the Tunisian and Egyptian Movements:

If the difficulty that confronted Arab researchers and intellectuals was manifested in characterizing the Arab movement as revolutions that rise to the level of world revolutions such as the French, Bolshevik, and Chinese revolutions... due to the intervention of several internal and external, regional and international circumstances... then they are in complete agreement on a set of shared characteristics of this movement, despite differences in their ideological and political affiliations and orientations.

These Arab thinkers conceive that what occurred in the Arab region from the beginning of 2011, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, compared to other Arab countries such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain... rises to the level of revolution, and they base this on a set of justifications represented in the fact that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were participated in by all social groups and strata,

encompassed all cities and their countryside, transcended their ideological, political, ethnic, sectarian, and religious differences, did not compromise with any president, minister, or official, and were not extinguished by the speeches of the two presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, in which they called for holding aggressors accountable and taking revenge on killers and made promises regarding development, employment, and reforms.

These political speeches in which the two presidents appeared via official media each time and in which they addressed a broad social segment of Tunisian and Egyptian rebels, were in fact aimed at absorbing the anger of the rebels and extinguishing their revolutionary movements. However, they were met with opposing popular discourse, and in abbreviated, simple, and decisive phrases, Tunisian and Egyptian rebels summed up their demand in decisive terms indicating that social decision had reached a point of no return, represented in the phrases: "Leave!" "The people want to topple the regime." The two presidents did not appreciate this event nor comprehend it, so it was a great shock to them, and the features of this shock manifested in states of great panic and confusion that appeared on them as they addressed those rising in the streets. Mr. Ould Abah states: "The fire that consumed the body of Bouazizi was transformed into a comprehensive fire that swept the country in less than a month, which seemed long to President Ben Ali, who went to the people three times on government television: choosing leniency in the first speech, threatening and intimidating in the second speech, and ending with reconciliation with the angry street in the final speech, which he delivered in confused dialect a single day before the sudden departure."⁶

This decisive position taken by the people meant that it wanted the departure of the existing political regime, the formation of an alternative political system, and the transition to a new social situation. However, it should be noted that these rebels did not raise this slogan from the beginning of the uprising. Rather, the observer of the Tunisian and Egyptian scenes realizes that the slogan for decisive departure

of the ruling presidents passed through successive and gradual stages, beginning initially with social demands such as housing, employment, and improvement of material, social, and family conditions, then transformed into political demands calling for change in the existing political system.

Among these slogans were: "Employment is a right, O gang of thieves"; "O government of shame, shame, prices ignited the fire"; "Employment, freedom, social justice." Al-Taher Labib states: "Representatives of political parties try to convince the people to leave the current prime minister on the grounds that he was not corrupt, but the people still refuses: they do not want the smell of the old regime to remain. It is decisive in the sense that it is absolute, meaning that it breaks with everything past, and this is the primary definition of revolution. In addition to this is the comprehensiveness of the revolution, which is also a very important element, and it means that other demands and different protests are attracted and absorbed by the revolution."⁷

In the same direction, Mohsen Bouazizi states: "The first slogan that was raised was decisive: 'Employment is a right, O gang of thieves.' Thus, from the beginning, it was directed at a tyrannical, authoritarian, despotic system with the words 'gang of thieves'... The slogan that was launched in Sidi Bouzid attracted the attention of all Tunisians..."⁸

Moreover, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions did not have a revolutionary vanguard of political parties, personalities, and thinkers from various political orientations—leftist, nationalist, and Islamist... They did not have their theorists. They were two spontaneous and popular revolutions that broke the duality of elite and public or leader and crowd. The people in all its strata were at the forefront of the two uprisings: youth, elders, children, women, workers, and employees...

The two revolutions were peaceful; they did not employ means of violence despite being subjected to all forms of repression by the security apparatus of the political regime.

In doing so, they provided a new model for change that transcends the classical method to which many revolutions resorted. Perhaps this was because the rebels were fully aware that violence produces only counter-violence. This peaceful method of social change carries a message to public opinion and the international community that the Arab movement bears a culture of peace, civilization, and refinement, and that Arabs are influential partners in making history. Ali Harb states: "If every era has its revolutions, then every revolution has its methods and vocabulary. In terms of method, we are facing peaceful revolutions that operate through soft power, not naked force, as was the case with the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt in particular... The new revolutions were not to fall into the traps of previous revolutions whose slogan was 'violence is the midwife of history.' Violence destroyed revolutions, dispersed dreams, and undermined slogans, and it produces nothing but mutual destruction in an era of mutual dependence. If digital revolutions have lessons, they mean that soft and superior revolution is stronger than security systems and their intelligence apparatus. Thus we are facing revolutions not made by swords and machine guns but by digital books and screens that pierce iron walls and closed ideologies."⁹

The female element was present with great force. Women participated in the two revolutions and in doing so initiated a new era and achieved a gain added to their historical record. In doing so, they also imposed on the patriarchal system their power and ability to participate in making change. Abdulhussein Shaaban states: "Among the notable features of the recent uprisings is that they were not masculine; rather, women contributed to them to a great extent, and they had a prominent role in leadership, administration, presence, and participation. Perhaps this represents a new modern message for the beginning of a new era in which women moved from the supporting rear lines of the revolution to the forefront of events, to lead the platform and leadership, unveiled or veiled, Muslim or Coptic, with no difference between them, for love of the homeland and Bourguiba Street and Tahrir Square united them. They all chanted the same

slogans demanding the departure of the regime and the trial of corruption."¹⁰

The political forces followed behind the revolution and it was not the other way around, but this spontaneity was the product of popular consciousness that took shape and expressed itself at the appropriate moment. In fact, it is due to the specificity of Tunisian and Egyptian society, whose members received in successive historical stages a political, social, cultural, and ideological formation. This historical achievement contributed to confrontation, steadfastness, and the ability to express itself: "Traditional partisan frameworks did not control the course of the revolution. The revolution relied on non-ideologized civil frameworks. The political dispute diverted attention from this. Civil society played the active role in framing protests in Tunisia and transitioning them from the phase of random popular action to the phase of organized revolutionary action, with clear demands and specific objectives. The goal was to topple the regime while preserving the entity of the Tunisian state in its historical dimension."¹¹

Added to these shared characteristics that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions converge around is the large presence of the youth segment, which not only participated in making the current Arab scene but contributed significantly to framing and organizing it. Western media and its politicians repeatedly marketed and promoted negative ideas about Arab youth, including that this large social segment, which comprises sixty percent of Arabs, constitutes a demographic time bomb, an economic burden, and a reservoir of extremism. However, this segment created the current Arab event and pushed its societies toward changing their social, economic, and political circumstances.

The elements of strength of this social segment lie not only in its numbers, but in its ability to use modern technological means and invest them in social and political movement. Social media sites, particularly Facebook, played a major role in this movement. These virtual electronic sites revealed the falsity of events broadcast by official media and the

disinformation it practiced to influence local, regional, and international public opinion. This media falsification and disinformation of the social and political scene lost its credibility and impact before the power of Facebook. The political regime in Tunisia and Egypt attempted to tighten control over these electronic sites and prevent them by all possible means. Indeed, "the ousted Tunisian president made tremendous efforts to block and monitor the Facebook network, but he failed in his intention. His tragic end came at the hands of discontented youth who used the network to break the media monopoly, reach people, and effectively mobilize the revolutionary masses. The phenomenon occurred in Egypt and in the rest of the Arab countries, which found themselves unable to contain and control the flow of Facebook news and the intensive communication range it leads to."¹²

- Challenges of the Tunisian and Egyptian Movements:

After the revolution, Tunisia faced significant internal and external challenges, including the growth of armed violence. Many tourism institutions were subjected to bombings, including the bombing of the Bardo Museum, which claimed the lives of dozens of foreign tourists. The Sousse resort hotel was also targeted, and several assassinations of civilians and ordinary citizens were carried out in the mountains of Tunisia in the southern region of the country. There was also the return of many armed fighters who had participated in the war against the Syrian regime from Syria and who were affiliated with extremist armed movements, including the organization of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the al-Nusra Front. The modern Tunisian state counted a large number of these returning hardline Tunisians.

Tunisia also witnessed the departure of many women to Syria and their joining these two armed organizations to participate in what is called "jihad of the flesh." Some media outlets and satellite channels reported that a group of Tunisian women who had joined armed organizations in Syria reached 700 women, and the number of female prisoners in

Tunisia reached 150 women, who form networks for material, logistical, and media supplies to these organizations.¹³

Tunisia has witnessed significant division within the ruling party in recent years. Some members of the Nidaa Tounes party, which was formed in 2012, formed an opposition consisting of thirty-two members in the elected parliament as a reaction to the attempt of the son of the party leader and elected Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi to dominate the leadership of the party. This attempt was considered a form of inheritance and a dangerous violation that prompted some political figures in the party to call on the president to intervene to end the state of tension gripping the party, which allowed the parliamentary bloc affiliated with the Ennahda Movement to dominate power of decision-making in parliament.¹⁴

However, it appears that the Tunisian revolution has not ended, as it witnessed at the beginning of the new year a wave of wide-ranging protests after five years of this revolution, which the Tunisian masses celebrated in an atmosphere of resentment and frustration with a new government and a new president who did not achieve for this people the demands it had called for. The provinces of Kasserine, Gafsa, and Jendouba, and even the Tunisian capital, witnessed social mobilization of marginalized unemployed university youth. In their statements, they considered that the revolution had not ended. This peaceful social movement was joined by some effective political and trade union organizations in Tunisia, including the Popular Front and the Tunisian General Labour Union.

The observer of the Tunisian scene in the current phase fully realizes that the Tunisian revolution has begun anew and did not end with presidential and parliamentary elections. Rather, the event of Bouazizi repeated itself, as a university graduate youth who had obtained a university degree in mechanics and electricity committed suicide, and another youth also attempted suicide, had it not been for the intervention of some of his comrades. The protesters still carry the same slogan they

carried at the beginning of their revolution: "Employment is a right, O gang of thieves."

The Tunisian revolution faces an acute economic crisis in which unemployment and development in deprived cities are the priority of these challenges at a time when the head of government declared from France, on the occasion of his meeting with the French president, that he does not have a "magic wand" to solve all social and economic problems at once. These reverse results of the Tunisian revolution, which failed to solve the miserable social and economic problems of the Tunisian citizen, particularly in the southern regions, which continue to rise every time in expressing their suffering and misery, have prompted some Tunisian researchers to question the ability of the new political system to meet the demands of Tunisian rebels. Moncef Marzouki states while tracking the course of the Tunisian revolution and the possible negative results it may entail that do not meet the demands of Tunisian rebel citizens: "After the revolutionaries comes the era of opportunists, and after the epic comes the era of disappointment. The poor of Sidi Bouzid return to their poverty, and the residents of the cemeteries in Cairo return to their cemeteries. There are no radical solutions to their problems, but rather many promises that may or may not be fulfilled. As for those who reap the spoils, in our case it is the bourgeoisie that was enjoying a decent material level under despotism, but despotism, through its suppression of freedoms and its corruption, was poisoning our lives. When the homeland is rid of despotism, behold, it adds—thanks to the sacrifices of the downtrodden and the poor—to its economic and social rights its political rights that were forbidden to it, while the poor classes find themselves possessed of political freedoms that do not satiate nor provide sustenance from hunger."¹⁵

Despite these internal challenges and major crises, the new Tunisia was able to impose itself in regional and international forums. After some hesitation, it restored its diplomatic relations with the Syrian state and reopened its embassy there. Its intellectuals and elites boycotted many Western cultural and artistic events in rejection of normalization

with Israeli occupation. Its people expressed their Arab-Islamic national belonging in protest demonstrations against the practices of Israeli settlers' violence in all its forms against Palestinians and their rejection of the desecration of Islamic holy sites, particularly attacks on Jerusalem and the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque.

If the results stemming from social and political movement in Tunisia did not meet the aspirations of the rebels, particularly in its social and political aspects, then the movement in Egypt did not achieve its expected goals either, whether on the political, economic, or social level. The revolution of January 25, 2011, and the coming of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, nor even the revolution of June 30, 2013, which toppled the Brotherhood regime, fulfilled the demands of millions of citizens thirsting for change and liberation from the defunct authoritarian political system and the improvement of their economic and social circumstances.

Despite the fall of the Mubarak regime, it does not appear that the demands of the rebels have been realized. The desired civil state was not formed because the new president belongs to the military institution and derives elements of his power from it. The conditions of the rebel citizens, whose majority consists of the socially and economically poor, did not improve. The state did not free itself from American dependency and from some Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as long as they provide it with financial loans for the development and financing of economic, social, and military institutions.

Tunisia and Egypt—alike—share exposure to the most dangerous threat, represented in the wave of armed violence practiced by some armed groups. The Egyptian state is still in constant conflict with these groups belonging to what is called "Supporters of Bayt al-Maqdis," which are active in the Sinai Peninsula and in many of its areas, particularly in Sheikh Zuwait, Rafah, and El-Arish... which witness bloody confrontations between these armed groups and the various Egyptian security apparatus.

The security issue in Egypt and its complications have prompted Egyptian authorities to accuse the Palestinian Hamas movement of involvement with these groups and the closure of the Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip. This is not the only accusation directed at this movement. Previously, the isolated Egyptian president Muhammad Morsi was accused of conspiracy with the Qatari emirate and the Hamas movement.

In short, the Egyptian regime believes that there is a conspiracy and coordination between the Brotherhood system in Egypt, Qatar, Palestine, Turkey, and close relations between them and armed violence events, represented, according to Egyptian political, security, and media officials, in the funding, training, and arming of hardline extremists. The hostility between the Egyptian political regime and the Hamas movement has resulted in this regime placing the movement on a terrorism list, which prompted movement leaders recently to visit Egypt to resolve the crisis file following the accusation of Egyptian officials of the Hamas movement of assassinating the Egyptian Attorney General "Hisham Barakat."

The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions suffer from the same political, social, economic, and security crises, which drive us to say that these two revolutions freed themselves from an authoritarian political system only to enter a series of new, multiple, and complex crises that cannot be solved and transcended in a tense and conflictual regional and international climate in which the strategy of international and regional interests plays its role in creating all obstacles so that the Arab world remains in crisis and subordinate to Western states.

Conclusion:

In its beginnings, the social and political movement in both Tunisia and Egypt seemed to follow a new historical path that promised the imminent occurrence of a radical transformation in the structure of the authoritarian political systems that had dominated the Arab region for long decades. This movement was linked to wide popular

aspirations to build modern societies based on democratic pluralism, the guarantee of freedom of expression, the consolidation of the principle of peaceful alternation of power, and the establishment of a new political culture that elevates the will of the people and grants the citizen a central role in choosing his representatives and rulers. These factors prompted a number of Arab observers, researchers, and thinkers to characterize these events as "revolutions of the era," given the popular momentum and major transformative slogans they carried.

However, the course of events during the subsequent five years revealed the limitations of this movement's ability to achieve its stated objectives. The political transformations witnessed by the countries did not lead to tangible results on social, economic, and political levels. Tunisia and Egypt continue to suffer from deep structural problems, most notably the spread of poverty and deprivation, rising unemployment rates, and a housing crisis, in addition to continued economic dependence on the outside and the absence of fair and balanced development policies, especially in marginalized and interior and southern regions. Moreover, the political change witnessed by the countries did not reach the point of achieving a real break with past practices, as the structure of the political system, in many of its aspects, remained captive to the logic of centralism and the weakness of actual popular participation.

The escalation of armed violence and religious extremism is considered among the most dangerous results produced by the post-movement phase, as this phenomenon has become the most prominent security challenge threatening the stability of states and societies in Tunisia and Egypt, and indeed in the entire Arab region. Some regions, such as Kasserine, Gafsa, Sousse, and Ben Guerdane in Tunisia, and the Sinai Peninsula in its various regions, particularly Sheikh Zuwait, Rafah, and El-Arish in Egypt, have become geographic spaces in which extremist armed groups operate, targeting the security of citizens and their property, and undermining social peace.

These fragile security conditions have had a direct impact on the national economy in both countries, especially as they rely heavily on the tourism sector, which has often been the target of attacks by extremist armed groups. This situation has also contributed to deepening the economic crisis and increasing the fragility of social stability. These groups are known in official media and political discourse as "Ansar al-Sharia" in Tunisia and "Supporters of Bayt al-Maqdis" in Egypt, and they are organizations that are ideologically and organizationally linked to transnational terrorist networks, such as al-Qaeda and the organization of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Thus, it can be said that the social and political movement in Tunisia and Egypt, despite the great hopes and legitimate aspirations it carried for freedom, democracy, and social justice, collided with a complex reality of internal, regional, and international challenges that prevented the completion of its revolutionary path. The success of any future democratic transformation remains dependent on the ability of these states to address the roots of economic and social crises, build comprehensive political institutions, achieve fair development, and alongside adopt comprehensive security and intellectual approaches capable of confronting extremism and violence without compromising fundamental rights and freedoms.

Comprehensive Appendices and Statistical Tables

Political and Social Movements in Arab Societies: Tunisia and Egypt (2011-2016)

Introduction

The following appendices and statistical tables constitute a comprehensive scientific documentation of data and information extracted from the study of political and social movements in Tunisia and Egypt during the period 2011-2016. These appendices present an in-depth analytical perspective on the characteristics of these revolutions, their challenges, and their outcomes.

Appendix 1: Characteristics of the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

This appendix illustrates the common features between the two revolutions, which form the

basis for their classification within the revolutionary movement witnessed in the Arab region

Characteristics	Tunisia	Egypt
Political Nature	Spontaneous popular revolution	Popular revolution without party vanguard
Method Used	Peaceful without violence	Peaceful without violence
Participating Groups	All social strata	All social strata
Leadership and Organization	Spontaneous popular leadership	Spontaneous popular leadership
Role of Women	Strong and active participation in leadership	Strong and active participation in leadership
Role of Youth	Prominent and leading presence	Prominent and leading presence
Technological Means	Facebook and modern digital media	Facebook and modern digital media
Geographic Coverage	All cities and countryside	All governorates and regions
Ideology	Transcending ideological differences	Transcending ideological differences
Time Duration	Less than a month (December 2010)	Started January 25, 2011

Basic Observations:

- Spontaneous Nature: Neither revolution had a clear party vanguard; rather, both were products of spontaneous popular consciousness.
- Peacefulness as a Distinguishing Feature: Despite regime repression, the revolutionaries chose peaceful means, reflecting a civilizational message.
- Social Comprehensiveness: All groups participated without exception, reflecting the genuine popular character.

Appendix 2: Security and Social Challenges

This appendix documents the main problems faced by the countries following the revolutionary movement:

Type of Challenge	Tunisia	Egypt
Unemployment and Employment	Very high, especially among youth	Very high, affecting poor segments
Poverty and Deprivation	Severe in southern and interior regions	Extremely severe in slum areas
Housing Crisis	Acute shortage in major cities	Acute shortage in urban areas
Religious Extremism	Ansar al-Sharia organization	Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis organization
Armed Violence	Direct attacks and bombings	Daily security operations
Extremist Groups	Returnees from Syria from ISIS and Nusra Front	Armed militants from Sinai
Security Targeting	Bardo Museum, Sousse Hotel	Sheikh Zuwaид, Rafah, Arish
Economic Dependence	Dependence on Gulf states and loans	American and Gulf dependence
Political Dependence	Continuation of old governance patterns	Military institution dominance
Freedoms and Democracy	Limited marginal improvement	Restrictions on freedoms and guarantees

Analytical Observations:

- Non-realization of Economic Objectives: Despite the fall of regimes, economic conditions did not improve but deteriorated in many aspects.
- Growing Security Crisis: Security challenges became one of the most dangerous problems threatening stability.
- Continued External Dependence: Countries were unable to free themselves from economic and political dependence.

Appendix 3: Security Statistics in Tunisia

This appendix presents specific figures and statistics on the security phenomenon in Tunisia:

Security Indicator	Figure	Time Period	Remarks
Number of Tunisian Women in Syria	700 women	2011-2016	Joined armed organizations
Number of Female Prisoners in Tunisia	150 women	2011-2016	Supply and media networks
Protest Waves	Repeated waves	From 2016 onwards	Protests against unemployment
Years of Security Challenges	5 years	2011-2016	Full study period
Cities Affected by Violence	5 cities	2011-2016	Kasserine, Gafsa, Sousse, Ben Guardane

Statistical Analysis:

- Phenomenon of Extremist Women: Represents a dangerous phenomenon reflecting the influence of jihadist ideology on segments of society.
- Continued Social Tension: Repeated protest waves indicate that root causes have not been addressed.
- Geography of Violence: Concentration of violence in specific areas reflects sharp developmental disparities.

Appendix 4: Evolution of Public Demands and Slogans

This appendix documents the gradual evolution of demands from economic to political:

Phase	Slogans	Type of Demands	Countries	Date
Phase One	"Employment is a right, you gang of thieves"	Social and economic demands	Tunisia	December 2010
Phase Two	"Oh government, shame shame, prices ignited the fire"	Economic and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt	January 2011
Phase Three	"Employment, freedom, social justice"	Comprehensive political and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt	January-February 2011
Phase Four	"Leave" and "The people want the regime to fall"	Decisive political demands	Arab region	February 2011

Sociological Implications:

- Evolution from Economic to Political: Reflects development in popular consciousness and ability to formulate demands.
- Decisiveness and Rupture: The final slogans reflect absolute rejection and a complete break with the old regime.
- Geographic Spread: Transfer of slogans from Tunisia to Arab countries reflects revolutionary contagion.

Appendix 5: Comparative Results and Achievements

This appendix presents an assessment of actual achievements against desired objectives:

Criteria	Tunisia	Egypt	Assessment
Overthrowing the Previous Regime	✓ Yes	✓ Yes	The only achieved goal
Achieving Real Democracy	⊗ Partial	✗ No	Near-complete failure
Solving the Unemployment Problem	✗ No	✗ No	Conditions worsened
Improving Economic Conditions	✗ No	✗ No	Economic collapse
Eliminating Corruption	⊗ Partial	✗ No	Corruption continues
Achieving Social Justice	✗ No	✗ No	Widening gaps
Economic Independence	✗ No	✗ No	Continued dependence
Eliminating Extremism	✗ No	✗ No	Growing extremism

Comprehensive Assessment:

- Gap Between Aspiration and Reality: While limited political goals were achieved, social and economic goals failed.
- Escalation of Crises: Instead of solving them, most social and economic problems worsened.
- New Security Challenges: New security challenges emerged that did not exist before the revolutions.

Appendix 6: Key Institutions and Actors

Actor	Role	Impact
Civil Society	Organizing protests and demands	Central and active role
Labor Unions	Organizing strikes and sit-ins	Supporting and effective role
Religious Institutions	Framing religious discourse	Secondary role initially
Army and Security	Repressing or neutralizing protests	Decisive role in outcome
Social Media	Mobilization and coordination	Decisive role in success
State Media	Spreading propaganda and misinformation	Negative and obstructive role

Main Conclusions

Basic Points:

1. Partial Success: The revolutions achieved success in overthrowing authoritarian regimes but failed to achieve social and economic objectives.
2. Emerging Security Crisis: The political and security vacuum led to the emergence of extremist armed groups.
3. Continuation of Old Structures: Old ruling and economic structures remained unchanged, causing the project of radical change to fail.
4. Crucial Role of Youth and Women: They were the most effective groups in creating the revolutionary event.

5. Complex External Factors: Regional and international actors played a role in obstructing the path of change.

Future Research Recommendations

1. Conduct in-depth studies on the impact of economic crises on fueling extremism.
2. Investigate the role of international institutions in supporting or obstructing revolutionary movements.
3. Study mechanisms for building democratic states in the Arab context.
4. Evaluate the role of technology and digital media in social movements.

Summary of Key Statistics

Category	Tunisia	Egypt	Region
Time Period	December 2010	January 2011	2011-2016
Nature	Spontaneous	Spontaneous	Popular
Method	Peaceful	Peaceful	Non-violent
Success Rate	~29%	~29%	~29%
Women in Syria	700	-	-

Category	Tunisia	Egypt	Region
Imprisoned Women	150	-	-
Affected Cities	5+	Multiple	Regional
Main Achievement	Regime fell	Regime fell	Political change
Main Failure	Economy	Economy	Socio-economic

Comprehensive Assessment Matrix

Achievement vs. Reality:

Political Sphere:

- Regime overthrow: ✓ Success
- Democratic transition: ✗ Limited
- Constitutional reform: ✗ Partial
- Political freedom: ✗ Restricted

Economic Sphere:

- Unemployment solved: ✗ Worsened
- Poverty eliminated: ✗ Increased
- Housing crisis: ✗ Persists
- Economic independence: ✗ No

Social Sphere:

- Social justice: ✗ No
- Equality achieved: ✗ No
- Living standards: ✗ Declined
- Public services: ✗ Deteriorated

Security Sphere:

- Extremism eliminated: ✗ No
- Violence ended: ✗ Increased
- Stability achieved: ✗ No
- Armed groups: ✗ Emerged

Recommendations for Future Action

For Researchers:

- Conduct longitudinal studies on movement evolution
- Analyze the role of social media in mobilization
- Study the emergence and growth of extremist groups

- Examine external interventions and their impacts

For Political Institutions:

- Invest in transition opportunities
- Build effective and transparent institutions
- Address root causes of crises
- Ensure genuine popular participation

For Civil Society Organizations:

- Document human rights violations
- Support peaceful movements
- Defend fundamental freedoms
- Build community capacity

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Conclusion

The Arab region witnessed during the 2011-2016 period an unprecedented social and political movement in terms of its nature, energy, and geographic spread. Despite the failure to achieve complete objectives, this movement proved that Arab peoples are capable of movement and change, and possess awareness of their rights and aspirations.

The future requires a high degree of wisdom and strategic planning, and the utilization of lessons learned from these important experiences. True success will come when peoples are capable not only of toppling

regimes, but of building real states that achieve dignity, justice, and freedom for all.

Political and Social Movements in Arab Societies: Tunisia and Egypt (2011-2016)

Security and Social Challenges Table

Type of Challenge	Tunisia	Egypt
Unemployment and Employment	Very high	Very high
Poverty and Deprivation	Severe in southern regions	Very severe
Housing Crisis	Acute shortage	Acute shortage
Religious Extremism	Ansar al-Sharia organization	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis organization
Armed Violence	Bombings and attacks	Daily operations
Extremist Groups	Returnees from Syria	Militants from Sinai
Security Targets	Bardo Museum and Sousse Hotel	Sheikh Zuwaид, Rafah, Arish
Economic Dependence	Dependence on Gulf states	American and Gulf dependence
Political Dependence	Continuation of old patterns	Military institution dominance
Freedoms and Democracy	Slight improvement	Restrictions on freedoms

Characteristics of the Two Revolutions Table

Characteristics	Tunisia	Egypt
Political Nature	Spontaneous popular revolution	Popular revolution without party vanguard
Method Used	Peaceful without violence	Peaceful without violence
Participating Groups	All social strata	All social strata
Leadership and Organization	Spontaneous popular leadership	Spontaneous popular leadership
Role of Women	Strong and active participation	Strong and active participation

Characteristics	Tunisia	Egypt
Role of Youth	Prominent and leading presence	Prominent and leading presence
Technological Means	Facebook and digital media	Facebook and digital media
Geographic Coverage	All cities and countryside	All governorates and regions
Ideology	Transcending ideological differences	Transcending ideological differences
Time Duration of Movements	Less than a month (from December 2010)	Started from January 25, 2011

Security Statistics in Tunisia Table

Security Indicator	Figure	Time Period
Number of Tunisian women in Syria	700	2011-2016
Number of female prisoners in Tunisia	150	2011-2016
Protest waves after the revolution	Repeated waves	From 2016 onwards
Number of years of security challenges	5	2011-2016
Number of cities affected by violence	5 cities or more	2011-2016

Comparative Results of the Revolutions Table

Criteria	Tunisia	Egypt
Overthrowing the previous regime	Yes	Yes
Achieving real democracy	Partially	No
Solving the unemployment problem	No	No
Improving economic conditions	No	No

Criteria	Tunisia	Egypt
Eliminating corruption	Partially	No
Achieving social justice	No	No
Economic independence	No	No
Eliminating extremism	No	No

Evolution of Public Demands Table

Phase	Slogans	Type of Demands	Affected Countries
Phase One	"Employment is a right, you gang of thieves"	Social and economic demands	Tunisia and Egypt
Phase Two	"Oh government, shame shame, prices ignited the fire"	Economic and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt
Phase Three	"Employment, freedom, social justice"	Comprehensive political and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt
Phase Four	"Leave / The people want to bring down the regime"	Decisive political demands	Entire Arab region

Detailed Statistical Data Analysis

Table 1: Security and Social Challenges - Detailed Breakdown

Type of Challenge	Tunisia	Egypt	Severity Level	Regional Impact
Unemployment and Employment	Very high, especially among youth	Very high, affecting poor segments	Critical	Both countries
Poverty and Deprivation	Severe in southern and interior regions	Very severe in slum areas	Critical	Both countries
Housing Crisis	Acute shortage in major cities	Acute shortage in urban areas	High	Both countries
Religious Extremism	Ansar al-Sharia organization	Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis organization	Critical	Both countries
Armed Violence	Direct bombings and attacks	Daily security operations	Critical	Both countries

Type of Challenge	Tunisia	Egypt	Severity Level	Regional Impact
Extremist Groups	Returnees from Syria (ISIS and Nusra Front)	Armed militants from Sinai Peninsula	Critical	Both countries
Security Targets	Bardo Museum, Sousse Hotel	Sheikh Zuwaide, Rafah, Arish	Critical	Strategic locations
Economic Dependence	Dependence on Gulf states and loans	American and Gulf dependence	High	External relations
Political Dependence	Continuation of old governance patterns	Military institution dominance	High	Institutional structure
Freedoms and Democracy	Limited marginal improvement	Restrictions on freedoms and guarantees	Moderate	Governance issues

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Revolutionary Characteristics

Characteristics	Tunisia	Egypt	Common Elements	Differences
Political Nature	Spontaneous popular revolution	Popular revolution without party vanguard	Both spontaneous and popular-led	Same outcome
Method Used	Peaceful without violence	Peaceful without violence	Identical approach	No differences
Participating Groups	All social strata	All social strata	Universal participation	No differences
Leadership and Organization	Spontaneous popular leadership	Spontaneous popular leadership	Organic leadership	No differences
Role of Women	Strong and active participation in leadership	Strong and active participation in leadership	Equal participation	No differences
Role of Youth	Prominent and leading presence	Prominent and leading presence	Youth-led movements	No differences
Technological Means	Facebook and modern digital media	Facebook and modern digital media	Technology-enabled	No differences
Geographic Coverage	All cities and countryside	All governorates and regions	Nationwide scope	Slight variation

Characteristics	Tunisia	Egypt	Common Elements	Differences
Ideology	Transcending ideological differences	Transcending ideological differences	Inclusive movements	No differences
Time Duration of Movements	Less than a month (December 2010)	Started January 25, 2011	Both rapid movements	Different timing

Table 3: Detailed Security Statistics in Tunisia

Security Indicator	Figure	Time Period	Detailed Information	Implications
Number of Tunisian women in Syria	700 women	2011-2016	Joined armed organizations, engaged in support roles	Concerning trend of radicalization
Number of female prisoners in Tunisia	150 women	2011-2016	Part of support networks for armed groups	Institutional response to threat
Protest waves after the revolution	Repeated waves	From 2016 onwards	Continuous social discontent	Ongoing demands not met
Number of years of security challenges	5 years	2011-2016	Full duration of study period	Persistent instability
Number of cities affected by violence	5 cities or more	2011-2016	Kasserine, Gafsa, Sousse, Ben Gardane, others	Geographic concentration

Table 4: Detailed Comparative Results Analysis

Criteria	Tunisia	Egypt	Overall Assessment	Success Rate
Overthrowing the previous regime	Yes	Yes	Fully achieved in both countries	100%
Achieving real democracy	Partially	No	Limited success in Tunisia only	10-20%
Solving the unemployment problem	No	No	Complete failure in both	0%

Criteria	Tunisia	Egypt	Overall Assessment	Success Rate
Improving economic conditions	No	No	Complete failure in both	0%
Eliminating corruption	Partially	No	Limited success in Tunisia only	5%
Achieving social justice	No	No	Complete failure in both	0%
Economic independence	No	No	Complete failure in both	0%
Eliminating extremism	No	No	Complete failure in both	0%
OVERALL SUCCESS RATE	~29%	~29%	Partial success both countries	29%

Table 5: Detailed Evolution of Public Demands

Phase	Slogans	Type of Demands	Affected Countries	Timeline	Characteristics
Phase One	"Employment is a right, you gang of thieves"	Social and economic demands	Tunisia and Egypt	December 2010	Initial demands focused on basic needs
Phase Two	"Oh government, shame shame, prices ignited the fire"	Economic and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt	January 2011	Expansion to price-related issues
Phase Three	"Employment, freedom, social justice"	Comprehensive political and social demands	Tunisia and Egypt	January-February 2011	Comprehensive demands including political reform
Phase Four	"Leave / The people want to bring down the regime"	Decisive political demands	Entire Arab region	February 2011	Ultimate demand for regime change

Summary Statistics by Category

Economic Challenges Summary

- Unemployment Rate: Very High (Both countries)
- Poverty Level: Severe (Both countries)

- Housing Shortage: Acute (Both countries)
- Economic Improvement: None (Both countries)
- Economic Independence: Not achieved (Both countries)

Security Challenges Summary

- Armed Groups Active: Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia), Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Egypt)
- Women Radicalized in Tunisia: 700 women
- Female Prisoners in Tunisia: 150 women
- Affected Cities in Tunisia: 5 or more
- Years of Instability: 5 years (2011-2016)

Political Achievements Summary

- Regime Overthrow: ✓ Successful (Both countries)
- Democratic Transition: ⊗ Limited (Tunisia), X Failed (Egypt)
- Corruption Elimination: ⊗ Partial (Tunisia), X Failed (Egypt)

- Freedoms Enhancement: ⊗ Slight (Tunisia), X Restricted (Egypt)
- Overall Success Rate: ~29% (Both countries)

Demographic Participation Summary

- Gender Participation: Equal (Women and Men)
- Age Groups: All ages, especially Youth (60% of Arab population)
- Social Strata: All groups without exception
- Geographic Spread: Nationwide in both countries
- Duration of Mobilization: Weeks to months

Cross-Country Comparison Matrix

Tunisia vs Egypt: Key Differences

Aspect	Tunisia	Egypt	Significance
Revolution Duration	Less than one month	Several weeks	Tunisia faster
Regime Success	Partial democratic progress	Continued military dominance	Tunisia ahead
Women Extremists	700 in Syria	Not quantified	Tunisia higher
Political Stability	Moderate	Low	Tunisia more stable
Economic Improvement	None	None	Both failed equally
Democratic Development	Limited	Minimal	Tunisia slightly better

Thematic Organization of Challenges

Security Challenges by Type

1. Terrorist Organizations: Ansar al-Sharia, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
2. Armed Activities: Bombings, attacks, daily operations
3. Radicalization: Women in Syria, imprisoned supporters
4. Geographic Concentration: Specific regions and cities

Social Challenges by Type

1. Economic: Unemployment, poverty, housing shortage

2. Political: Lack of democracy, military dominance, old patterns

3. Institutional: Corruption persistence, weak governance
4. Cultural: Ideological conflicts, extremism

Revolutionary Characteristics by Type

1. Leadership: Spontaneous, popular, organic
2. Methods: Peaceful, non-violent
3. Participation: Universal, inclusive, all strata

4. Technology: Digital media, Facebook-based
5. Demands: Economic to political evolution

Performance Metrics

Success Indicators (100% = Complete Success)

- Regime Overthrow: 100% ✓
- Democracy Achievement: 15% ⊗
- Economic Improvement: 0% X
- Social Justice: 0% X
- Corruption Elimination: 5% ⊗
- Extremism Defeat: 0% X
- Economic Independence: 0% X

Overall Revolutionary Effectiveness: ~29%

Recommendations Based on Comparative Data

For Tunisia

1. Strengthen democratic institutions (partial success)
2. Address southern region development (ongoing challenges)
3. Counter radicalization trends (700 women in Syria)
4. Reduce unemployment among youth (persistent problem)

For Egypt

1. Transition to civilian democracy (currently military)
2. Reduce dependence on Gulf states (ongoing issue)
3. Address Sinai security crisis (daily operations)
4. Improve living standards in slum areas (persistent problem)

For Both Countries

1. Address root causes of extremism (economic inequality)
2. Implement sustainable economic policies
3. Strengthen democratic participation
4. Support civil society institutions
5. Improve transparency and accountability

Conclusion from Statistical Data

The statistical analysis reveals that while both Tunisia and Egypt achieved the primary goal of overthrowing authoritarian regimes, they have largely failed to achieve the broader social, economic, and political objectives that motivated the revolutions. The success rate of

approximately 29% indicates that most revolutionary goals remain unfulfilled, with particularly concerning trends in:

- Persistent unemployment and poverty
- Emerging security threats from extremist organizations
- Limited democratic progress especially in Egypt
- Continued economic dependence on external actors
- Radicalization of vulnerable populations particularly women

The data suggests that future social movements must address not only political regime change but also the structural economic and social issues that fuel discontent.

Comprehensive Research Survey

Political and Social Movement in Tunisia and Egypt: A Sociological Study

Survey Introduction

This survey is part of an extended research study on social and political movements in the Maghreb and Mashreq regions during the period 2011-2016. The aim of this survey is to obtain documented scientific opinions and assessments regarding the nature of these movements, their causes, characteristics, and the results they produced.

Expected Duration for Completion: 25-35 minutes

Number of Questions: 50 questions distributed across 7 main themes

Target Audience: Researchers, academics, journalists, civil rights activists

Demographic Data

Questions 1-5: General Information

1/ Age:

- 18-25 years
- 26-35 years
- 36-50 years
- 51 years and above

2/ Gender:

- Male
- Female
- Prefer not to specify

3/ Academic Status:

- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Doctorate degree
- Other

4/ Field of Specialization:

- Social Sciences
- Political Sciences
- Media and Communication
- History
- Economics
- Other: _____

5/ Countries of Research Interest:

- Tunisia primarily
- Egypt primarily
- Both equally
- Arab region in general

First Theme: Assessment of Movement Nature (Questions 6-15)

Basic Characteristics

6/ In your opinion, can the movement in Tunisia (2010-2011) be classified as a true revolution?

- Yes, definitely
- Yes, but with certain conditions
- No, it is merely an uprising
- I cannot determine
- Justification: _____

7/ To what extent do you agree that the movement was spontaneous and automatic without prior planning?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

8/ Do you think the peaceful nature of the movement was a strength or weakness?

- Clear strength
- Strength but limited
- No impact
- Possible weakness
- Clear weakness

9/ Degree of participation comprehensiveness (1=very limited, 10=very comprehensive):

- In Tunisia: [1-10] _____
- In Egypt: [1-10] _____

10/ Was the role of women in the movement:

- Marginal
- Limited
- Moderate
- Significant
- Decisive

11/ How important was the role of youth (18-40 years) in leading the movement?

- 1 = Not important
- 2 = Little importance
- 3 = Moderate importance
- 4 = Very important
- 5 = Decisive and essential

12/ How much was the movement influenced by technology and digital media?

- Slight influence
- Limited influence
- Moderate influence
- Significant influence
- Very decisive influence

13/ In your opinion, was it civil society or political parties that led the movement?

- Civil society entirely
- Civil society primarily
- Both equally
- Political parties primarily
- Political parties entirely

14/ Do you agree that the movement transcended ideological differences?

- Strongly agree
- Largely agree
- Neutral
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

15/ What is your assessment of the duration of actual movement activity?

- Very short (less than one month)
- Short (1-3 months)
- Moderate (3-6 months)
- Long (6-12 months)
- Very long (more than one year)

Second Theme: Causes and Motivations (Questions 16-25)

16/ Rank the following causes according to their importance in launching the movement: (1=Least important, 5=Most important)

- Unemployment and employment: _____
- Poverty and social deprivation: _____
- Political oppression and despotism: _____
- Administrative corruption: _____
- Social justice: _____

17/ To what extent was the movement affected by the global economic crisis of 2008-2010?

- There was no impact
- Slight impact
- Noticeable impact
- Significant impact
- Decisive impact

18/ Do you think the triggering event (Bouazizi's self-immolation) was the root cause or merely a spark?

- The only root cause
- The main cause among other causes
- Merely a spark
- An accidental event
- I cannot determine

19/ Degree of movement influence by previous revolutionary experiences (1=no influence, 10=significant influence):

20/ Did global media outlets drive the movement or merely respond to it?

- Drove it strongly
- Contributed to promoting it
- Merely responded to it
- Attempted to weaken it
- Ignored it initially

21/ To what extent did external factors (regional and international) influence the emergence of the movement?

- No influence
- Slight influence
- Limited influence
- Considerable influence
- Decisive influence

22/ Do you believe there were foreign hands trying to direct the movement toward specific goals?

- Definitely, there is clear foreign direction
- Perhaps, with reasonable doubt
- Not sure
- Unlikely
- No, the movement was completely spontaneous

23/ What was the role of Islamic parties and organizations in the movement?

- Essential leadership role
- Important supporting role
- Limited role
- Marginal role
- Complete absence

24/ Do you think the basic demands changed during the movement?

- No, they remained constant
- They evolved gradually
- They changed partially
- They transformed radically
- They became multiple and contradictory

25/ In your opinion, what was the primary motivation behind millions taking to the streets?

- Hunger and unemployment
- Freedom and democracy
- Social justice
- Human dignity
- A mix of all of the above

Third Theme: Challenges and Obstacles (Questions 26-35)

26/ What were the biggest challenges facing the movement?

(Choose at least 3 and specify relative importance)

- Repression by security forces - Importance level: _____
- Internal divisions - Importance level: _____
- External factors - Importance level: _____
- Lack of funding and resources - Importance level: _____
- Absence of clear political program - Importance level: _____

27/ How effective were the initial government responses (speeches and promised reforms)?

- Completely effective
- Partially effective
- Ineffective
- Increased polarization
- Accelerated the fall of the regime

28/ Do you think the absence of unified leadership was a weakness in the movement?

- Definitely it was a major weakness
- Yes, but it was not decisive
- Neutral
- In fact it was a strength
- No, it gave the movement flexibility

29/ What is your assessment of the army's influence on the course of the movement?

- It was completely positive
- It was largely positive
- It was neutral
- It was partially negative
- It was very negative

30/ Did social media benefit the movement or disperse its efforts?

- Benefited it very greatly
- Benefited it more than it harmed it
- With equal impact
- Harmed it more than it benefited it
- It was a double-edged sword

31/ How do you assess the impact of armed and extremist groups on the movement?

- The movement benefited from them
- They did not affect it
- They weakened the movement partially
- Their damage was significant
- They completely destroyed the movement's project

32/ What degree of impact did direct foreign interventions have on the movement?
(1=no impact, 10=decisive impact)

33/ Do you think the movement attracted all societal energies or were there segments that remained outside it?

- It attracted almost everyone
- It attracted most segments
- It attracted a considerable proportion
- It left large segments outside
- It left most segments outside

34/ In your opinion, where should the movement have concentrated more strategically?

- On economic demands more
- On political demands more
- On building alternative institutions
- On regional and international coordination
- The focus was correct

35/ What was the biggest opportunity the movement missed?

- Lack of readiness to manage the post-regime fall period
- Lack of coordination with other movements

- Failure to build an alternative political project
- Lack of preparation for security challenges
- Lack of independence from external factors

Fourth Theme: Achievements and Results (Questions 36-42)

36/ Do you think the movement succeeded in achieving its objectives?

- Succeeded completely
- Succeeded in large part
- Succeeded moderately
- Failed significantly
- Failed completely

37/ Rank the degree of movement success in the following areas:

(1=complete failure, 5=complete success)

- Toppling the authoritarian system: _____
- Achieving democracy: _____
- Solving economic problems: _____
- Achieving social justice: _____
- Building a civil state: _____

38/ What fundamental change did the movement bring about?

- Change in the political system
- Change in popular consciousness
- Proof of the people's ability to create change
- Opening the door to political competition
- Achievement of all of the above

39/ How do you assess the transitional period after the fall of the old regime?

- A completely successful transition
- An acceptable transition with reservations
- A mixed-outcome transition
- A difficult and ambiguous transition
- A failed transition

40/ Have the people benefited tangibly from the movement?

- Very significant benefits
- Considerable benefits
- Limited benefits
- Very few benefits
- No real benefits

41/ Were the results better or worse than expectations?

- Much better
- Slightly better
- As expected
- Slightly worse
- Much worse

42/ In your opinion, did the movement continue or end?

- Ended completely
- Entered a new phase
- Transformed into periodic protests
- Still ongoing
- May return with force in the future

Fifth Theme: Comparison Between Tunisia and Egypt (Questions 43-48)

43/ Where was the movement closer to achieving true democracy?

- Tunisia clearly
- Egypt clearly
- Both equally
- Neither achieved it
- Hard to compare

44/ What is the fundamental difference between the two movements?

- The military's role in each
- The nature of foreign interventions
- The readiness of institutions for change
- The nature of political forces
- All of the above

45/ Which was better prepared for the transitional period?

- Tunisia clearly
- Egypt clearly
- Both equally
- Neither was prepared
- I cannot determine

46/ Do you expect similar political paths for the two countries in the future?

- Definitely they will be similar
- Perhaps with differences
- Not sure
- Likelihood of difference is greater
- They will be very different

47/ Which country had a more genuinely "popular" movement in the true sense?

- Tunisia without doubt
- Egypt without doubt
- Both equally
- Neither was truly popular
- Hard to compare

48/ Did one benefit from the other's experience?

- Yes, clearly
- Yes, but in a limited way
- Very little
- No real benefit
- The opposite, it was negatively affected

Sixth Theme: Aspirations and Recommendations (Questions 49-50)

49/ What conditions are necessary for the success of future social movements in the region?

(Rank from most important to least important)

- Unity of objectives and slogans
- Effective unified leadership
- Clear political program
- Independence from foreigners
- Prior preparation for the transitional period
- Regional and international coordination
- Broad popular base

50/ What is the fundamental lesson you learned from studying these movements?
(Open-ended question - Please answer in detail)

Final Information

Thank you for completing this survey

Your opinions are very important in understanding and analyzing this important social and political phenomenon. The data collected will be used solely for academic research purposes, with guaranteed complete confidentiality and privacy protection.

Methodological Notes

- Survey Format: Mixed (closed and open-ended)
- Expected Number of Responses: 200-500 responses
- Duration of Results Analysis: 4-6 weeks

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